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The question about the determinants of leverage is central in corporate nance, but re-
searchers have not yet reached a consensus about it. Several studies (e.g., Titman and Wessels
(1988), Rajan and Zingales (1995), Frank and Goyal (2009), and many others) report di¤erent
rm characteristics that partially explain the variation in rm leverage. However, Lemmon,
Roberts, and Zender (2008) show that most of the heterogeneity in capital structure is ex-
plained by rm-specic xed e¤ects, while time-varying determinants play a small role. That
is, they nd that whereas traditional determinants help to understand the evolution of lever-
age over time, most of the variation in capital structure is due to cross-sectional di¤erences
among rms, which are captured by rm-specic xed e¤ects. Structural modeling is a nat-
ural way to study the unobserved heterogeneity.1 I then estimate a dynamic structural model
of the rm to further investigate the determinants of leverage decisions.
The structural approach has three important benets. First, the dynamic model repro-
duces many data regularities observed by the empirical literature in corporate nance while
providing a possible explanation for them (e.g., it helps to better understand the primitive
characteristics of the rm that a¤ect those rm-specic xed e¤ects). Second, I am able to
explore how structural di¤erences across rms imply di¤erent leverage behavior by perform-
ing controlled experiments di¢ cult to replicate with real data. Lastly, I can use the model to
evaluate alternative public policies, e.g., how changes in the corporate income tax rate a¤ect
rm leverage behavior.
Lemmon, Roberts, and Zender (2008) also nd that mean-reversion of leverage ratios is
partially explained by active management of leverage toward desired levels, and argue that
a dynamic model can rationalize this behavior. An important benet of dynamic models is
that they are a more sensible representation of the rms decision making process, as opposed
to static ones. First, dynamic models capture the fact that a rms choices depend on its
history of states, which is the outcome of the idiosyncratic uncertainty faced by the rm in
1Other papers in corporate nance use dynamic structural models to study di¤erent aspects of rm deci-
sions. Brennan and Schwartz (1984), Fisher, Heinkel, and Zechner (1989), Goldstein, Ju, and Leland (2001),
Strebulaev (2007), Titman and Tsyplakov (2007), Tserlukevich (2008) use continuous time models. Moyen
(2004, 2007), Hennessy and Whited (2005, 2007), Gamba and Triantis (2008), Riddick and Whited (2008),
DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Whited (2011) use discrete time models.
2
the past, and the decisions it made in consequence. Second, these models also treat rms as
forward-looking agents, that is, rms consider the impact of current investment, leverage, and
payout decisions on future states and decisions.
The dynamic model in the present article is based on the trade-o¤ theory of capital
structure and, therefore, explicitly captures the e¤ect of leverage on rm value introducing
the benets (i.e., interest tax shields) and costs (i.e., costs of nancial distress) of debt. I also
include costs of external nancing to rationalize the direct evidence of the importance of these
expenses, as reported by Altinkilic and Hansen (2000). For a single decision maker, leverage
ratio uctuates around a long-run, time-invariant level as the rm receives di¤erent prot
shocks over time. This mean-reversion of leverage is due to both the active management of
the debt-equity ratio by the rm and the mean-reversion of prot shocks. The model produces
a constant target leverage, which is the capital structure ratio to which the rm would converge
if it repeatedly received the same neutral prot shock for a long time. This denition of target
leverage is described in DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Whited (2011), who estimate a dynamic
model in which rms move temporarily away from target by issuing transitory debt to take
advantage of investment opportunities.
I use the model to construct a panel of di¤erent types of rms and investigate whether it
generates the leverage patterns found by Lemmon, Roberts, and Zender (2008). I reproduce
their experiments and nd that the dynamic model consistently replicates their results. The
power of traditional determinants of capital structure, mainly protability and market-to-book
ratio, to explain leverage decisions turns out to be fairly small, while most of the variation in
leverage is explained by the constant value around which leverage oscillates for each type of
rm in the panel. This value is a function of the primitive characteristics of the rm, which
include the managerial behavior (e.g., how forward-looking the rm is, the attitude of the rm
towards risk), the production technology of the rm (e.g., the elasticity of output with respect
to capital in the production function, the rate of depreciation of capital), etc. Moreover, the
variation of any of these structural features changes the mean level around which leverage
uctuates. Finally, the analysis shows that this constant value is independent of the state of
the world. That is, it does not depend on time-varying determinants such as operating prots
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or market-to-book ratio.
I also investigate the patterns of convergence and stability of leverage reported by the
aforementioned authors. The objective of this analysis is to ascertain whether these observed
properties of the data appear in the context of the dynamic model. By using the simulated
panel, I construct both the actual and unexpected leverage portfolios and nd that the
dynamic model replicates their results very closely. In the context of the dynamic model,
convergence of leverage is generated by the fact that rm leverage decisions are mean-reverting.
Thus, when averaged into the four portfolios, rms with relatively high (low) leverage tend
to return to more moderate levels of leverage over time. Leverage stability refers to the
observation that rms with relatively high (low) leverage tend to keep relatively high (low)
leverage for long periods of time. This feature of the data appears in the context of the
dynamic model because each rm type in the panel mean-reverts to a di¤erent constant value.
Consequently, the long-run values to which the four portfolios converge are the average of the
unconditional means of leverage decisions of all rms included in the corresponding portfolio.
These results further suggest that, in the context of the dynamic model, the unobserved
heterogeneity explains most of the cross-sectional variation in leverage in the panel, and the
power of usual time-varying determinants to explain such variation is fairly limited.
Given that I control the model parameter (volatility of prot shocks) used to introduce rm
heterogeneity into the panel, I can further analyze the e¤ects of including it in the construction
of the unexpectedportfolios. The objective of this experiment is to check whether volatility
of prot shocks explains most of the remaining cross-sectional variation in leverage. This
should be the case because that parameter is the only source of rm heterogeneity in the
simulated panel. As expected, adding that parameter makes leverage stability disappear and
the four portfolios converge almost completely to the same value over time. Therefore, these
results suggest that important leverage determinants might be missing in traditional capital
structure studies.
Finally, I use the previous panel to study the mean-reverting properties of leverage deci-
sions. In particular, the speed of mean-reversion of leverage is still subject to great debate in
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the literature.2 I nd that leverage mean-reverts to the long-run constant level at a moderate
speed of 35.87% per year, which implies a half-life of 1.56 years. That is, rms close half
the gap between its current leverage ratio and the long-run mean level in approximately 1.56
years. This estimate is close to the empirical evidence of Flannery and Rangan (2006) and
DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Whited (2011), who suggest speeds of adjustment of 34.40% and
37.80% per year, respectively.
From the methodological perspective, this paper is closest to Hennessy and Whited (2007),
who use a dynamic model of the rm to estimate the magnitude of nancing costs, such as
equity otation costs and bankruptcy costs. Hennessy and Whited (2005) also use a dynamic
model to explain empirical ndings apparently inconsistent with the static trade-o¤ theory.
From an econometric standpoint, I recover the structural parameters by using the E¢ cient
Method of Moments (EMM) developed by Gallant and Tauchen (1996). EMM is a systematic
approach for selecting moments when estimating a structural model using Generalized Method
of Moments (GMM). The key idea of this approach is to match the moments implied by the
structural model to the moments implied by the data. The estimation method is particularly
useful when the likelihood function of the structural model does not have a closed form, but
the dynamic system can be easily simulated. This is exactly my situation.
EMM estimation can be regarded as a two-stage procedure. In the rst stage, I use a
semi-nonparametric (SNP) density function to describe the statistical properties of the data,
namely, investment and leverage decisions. The outcome of this stage is a family of density
functions for the joint distribution of the data, and I choose the one that best ts the sample
in the most parsimonious way. I recover the structural parameters of the dynamic model in
the second stage. These estimators are those that generate simulations of investment and
leverage decisions as close as possible to the observed data. The estimates of the structural
parameters are consistent with the ndings in the previous literature, have the correct sign
according to economic theory, and are statistically signicant.
The paper is organized as follows. Section I describes the model. In Section II, I describe
2See, for instance, Fama and French (2002), Flannery and Rangan (2006), Huang and Ritter (2009), and
DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Whited (2011).
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the data used for estimation. I discuss the identication strategy in Section III. In Section
IV, I examine the EMM procedure and present the estimation results. Section V analyzes the
predictions of the model about leverage decisions and presents the main results of the paper.
Section VI concludes.
I. The Model
The methodology I use to develop the model is discrete time, innite horizon, stochastic
dynamic programming. The objective of the rm is to maximize its value, which is achieved
by maximizing the expected discounted sum of cash ows to investors. Before formally stating
the maximization problem of the rm, I start by carefully describing each of its components.
Agents are risk-neutral and use the risk-free rate of interest, rf , as their discount rate.
State variables with primes indicate values in the next period, e.g., next-period prots are
referred as z0, while state variables with minus signs indicate values in the previous period,
e.g., previous-period prots are z . Finally, current values of state variables are indicated
with no sign, e.g., current-period prots are z.
There are two endogenous state variables: capital k and debt d. The capital of the rm, k,
is used for production and can vary (i.e., increase or decrease) over time because of investment
decisions and depreciation. In each period, capital depreciates at a constant rate  > 0.
The debt of the rm, d, matures in one period and is rolled over every period. This
structure of debt is similar to a perpetual bond with a oating rate. The total amount of
debt can be increased or decreased over time according to the debt decisions. The debt
contract includes a positive net worth covenant by which if, in any period, the value of
the rm falls below the nominal value of the debt, the rm goes into bankruptcy and is
liquidated. Therefore, the bond yield required by debt-holders will depend on the probability
of bankruptcy. The impact of risky debt on the determination of the bond yield will be fully
explained below.
There is one source of uncertainty (the exogenous state variable) that drives the optimal
policies of the rm, the protability shock, z. This shock changes the marginal protability
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of capital, making it more or less attractive to invest. Therefore, high realizations of z are
followed by large investment decisions, and vice versa. I assume state variable z follows an
AR(1) process3
z0 = c+ zz + "
0 (1)
where " is assumed to be an iid truncated normal random variable with mean 0 and variance
2". Therefore, shock z takes values in the compact set Z = [z; z].
The operating prots of the rm, (k; z), depend on the capital in place, k, and the
protability shock, z, in the following way
 (k; z) = zk (2)
where  2 (0; 1). Equation (2) shows that the operating prot function is of the Cobb-Douglas
form with decreasing marginal protability. Cooper and Ejarque (2003) show that the function
(k; z) is a reduced form prot function that is obtained after the rm maximizes over the
exible factors, such as labor. Decreasing marginal prots are likely to arise when rms
compete in an imperfect way and/or when rms have limited managerial or organizational
resources. The former argument is suggested by Hennessy and Whited (2005) while the latter
is suggested by Lucas (1978).
I assume issuing debt and equity is costly. This assumption incorporates the direct evi-
dence provided by Altinkilic and Hansen (2000) on the importance of underwriter fees. Fur-
thermore, they suggest that the costs of issuance are convex, both for debt and equity. Con-






















where xd and xe are the two decision variables. The former refers to debt reductions (-) and
increments (+) while the latter refers to equity payouts (-) and issuances (+). Parameters d1




2 reect the costs of issuing
3 It is common in the literature to assume z follows an AR(1) process in logs as in Gomes (2001), Moyen
(2004, 2007), Hennessy and Whited (2005, 2007). My choice of the process allows for negative shocks that
might, eventually, make the rm go into bankruptcy.
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equity. This cost function generates a convex cost of external nance, which is consistent with
the paper mentioned above. The indicator function d equals 1 if x
d > 0, and 0 otherwise.
Similarly, the indicator function e equals 1 if x
e > 0, and 0 otherwise. This means that
issuing capital is costly while reducing it is not. I assume that the costs of external nance
can be deducted from earnings for tax purposes.
Corporate earnings are taxed at rate  c. Therefore, the rms net income is dened by
NI =
h










(1   c) (4)
where rd(k; d; k ; d ; z ) is the bond yield required by debt-holders during the last period.
The bond yield also depends on the previous-period values of k, d and z (i.e., k , d  and
z ). The reason for this dependence will be shown below. Equation (4) shows an important
component of the dynamic model: the benets of debt created by the interest tax shield.
Finally, the internal cash ow of the rm is
ICF =
h










(1   c) + k (5)
and its utility in each period, or cash ow to investors, is
u

k; d; z; k ; d ; z ; xd; xe

=  xd + rd
 
k; d; k ; d ; z 

d  xe: (6)
This is the cash ow received (+) or provided (-) by rm investors in each period.
I now dene the transition functions and state space of the two endogenous state variables.
The state equation of capital k satises the accounting cash-ow equation and is dened as
k0 = k (1  ) + ICF + xd + xe: (7)
Equation (7) means that, every period, the rm invests an amount equal to ICF + xd + xe.
That is, the internal cash ow plus (minus) the money received from (paid to) debtholders





k is the maximum level of capital. Following Gomes (2001) and Hennessy and Whited (2005,





(1   c)  ( + rf ) k = 0: (8)
8
Intuitively, at capital level k, after-tax operating prots just cover depreciation and the op-
portunity cost of capital. Therefore, it is not economically protable to accumulate capital
to a level k > k:
The transition function of debt d is dened as
d0 = d+ xd: (9)





The previous restrictions on the state space of k and d bind the decision variables xd and
xe to a compact set. Specically,4
xd 2  d; k   d and xe 2   (k   d) ; k   (k   d) : (10)
I can now describe the dynamic behavior of the rm over time. During period t, the
rm operates with capital k and has debt d. At the end of period t (i.e., at moment t) the
protability shock z is realized and the complete state vector, (k; d; z; k ; d ; z ), is available
to determine the value of the rm. If rm value is below the nominal value of the debt, the
rm goes into bankruptcy and is liquidated, that is, the dynamic process stops. Otherwise, it
continues in the business and selects xd and xe. These decisions determine capital k0 and debt
d0 to be used during period t+ 1. Figure 1 shows a graphical representation of this behavior.
[Insert Figure 1 about here]
As stated above, the objective of the rm is to maximize its lifetime utility or rm value,
which is achieved by maximizing the expected discounted sum of cash ows to investors.









(1 + rf )
t yt subject to dt < kt (11)
where v0 is the current value of the rm, E is the expectation given current information (i.e.,
initial capital stock, debt and protability shock), and yt is dened as
yt = u
 
kt; dt; zt; kt 1; dt 1; zt 1; xdt ; xet

if vt > dt
yt = Lt; yt+1 = yt+2 = ::: = 0 if vt  dt
(12)
4This formulation of debt allows for the possibility that d = k. However, this is without any loss of generality
because that event is never optimal in the dynamic model at the estimated values of the parameters.
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where Lt is the liquidation value of the rm at moment t as described below by equation (13).
The interpretation of the maximization problem is as follows: every period the rm must
choose xdt and x
e
t in such a way that it maximizes the expected discounted sum of cash ows
to investors (this refers to the rst line of equation (12)). However, if in any period the value
of the rm falls below the nominal value of the debt, it goes into bankruptcy while investors
receive its liquidation value and zero thereafter (this refers to the second line of equation
(12)).
The model assumes the debt is protected with a positive net worth covenant, and thus the
bankruptcy-triggering event consists in the value of the rm falling below the nominal value
of the debt. In that case, the rm goes into bankruptcy and is liquidated. Accordingly, the
(liquidation) value of the rm that goes into bankruptcy is
v
 
k; d; z; k ; d ; z 

= L = [k (1  ) + ICFb] (1  ) (13)
where ICFb = [ (k; z)  k] (1   c) + k is the internal cash ow in the period previous to
bankruptcy and  reects the direct costs of bankruptcy. Intuitively, the liquidation value of
the rm is the realization into cash of total assets (depreciated capital plus internal cash ow)
minus the direct costs of bankruptcy. Every period, the dynamic model trades-o¤ the benets
of debt (i.e., interest tax shield) against the costs of debt (i.e., direct costs of bankruptcy)
and the costs of external nance, and decides optimal investment, leverage, and payout to
shareholders. Therefore, these components capture the fundamental driving forces of the
trade-o¤ theory in the context of the dynamic model.
In the event of bankruptcy, the recovery amount accruing to debt claimants is
R (k; d; z) = min fL; dg = min f[k (1  ) + ICFb] (1  ) ; dg : (14)
Equation (14) means that the value accruing to debt-holders is the minimum between the
liquidation value of the rm and the nominal value of the debt. Accordingly, fair pricing of











dz0 j k; d; z (15)
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where the indicator function b equals 1 if the rm goes into bankruptcy, and 0 otherwise.
This equation means that debt-holders require a bond yield, rd, which equates the nominal
value of the debt (left-hand side) to the expected discounted payo¤ of debt in the next period
(right-hand side). If the rm avoids bankruptcy, the debt payo¤ is the nominal value plus
the promised yield, d0 (1 + rd). On the contrary, if the rm does go into bankruptcy, the debt
payo¤ is the recovery amount, R (k0; d0; z0). Furthermore, the bond yield required by debt
claimants can be solved for explicitly and is given by
rd
 
k0; d0; k; d; z

=
1 + rf   1d0
R
bR (k
0; d0; z0)F (dz0 j k; d; z)R
(1  b)F (dz0 j k; d; z)
  1: (16)
The last step to complete the dynamic model of the rm is to describe its recursive
formulation. Let v = v(k; d; z; k ; d ; z ). Then, the value of the rm that does not go into









[(1  b) v0 + bL0]F (dz0 j k; d; z)
o
subject to d0 < k0:
(17)
This value function represents the maximized value of the rm, namely, the maximized ex-
pected discounted sum of cash ows to investors.
The implementation of the model is described in Appendix 1. Finally, let  = 1= (1 + rf ),








2;  c; ).
II. Data
The data used in this study are from the yearly Standard & Poors Compustat industrial
les. The sample includes all rms in the database and covers the period 1988 to 2009. I
choose to start the sample in 1988 to avoid the structural break implied by the Tax Reform
Act of 1986. To select the sample, I follow a procedure similar to that of Hennessy and
Whited (2007). I delete rm-year observations with missing or negative data. Furthermore,
5The recursive formulation of the rm problem is equivalent to the maximization problem given by equation
(11).
11
I include in the sample only rms that have at least two consecutive years of data. Finally, I
exclude regulated, nancial or public service rms, that is, I exclude all rms whose primary
SIC code is between 4900 and 4999, between 6000 and 6999, or greater than 9000. After this
procedure, the nal sample includes 14,465 di¤erent rms and 111,944 rm-year observations.
The nal sample is an unbalanced panel with a minimum of 4,295 and a maximum of 6,457
observations per year.
Data variables are dened in the following way: capital k is Book Assets - Total (variable
"at" or data item 6) and debt d is Long-Term Debt - Total (variable dlttor data item 9) plus
Debt in Current Liabilities - Total (variable dlcor data item 34). For estimation purposes,
I compute the following two decision variables: investment ratio, i, and book leverage, l.
I choose the investment decision to be a ratio because that allows me to homogenize the









Table I shows summary statistics of the sample. I eliminate observations with investment
greater than 200% to reduce the e¤ect of extreme observations and eradicate errors in the
data.6 The investment ratio decision has a mean value of 11.58% per year, while the book
leverage decision has a mean value of 46.55%. Investment ratio has a positive skewness of
1.611, which indicates that positive changes in investment are more frequent than negative
ones. Investment also shows a kurtosis in excess of 3 at 8.083, which suggests that large
changes in the investment distribution are more frequent than those implied by the normal
distribution. On the contrary, book leverage data show statistics much closer to those of
the normal distribution. Leverage skewness is slightly positive at 0.063 while its kurtosis is
somewhat below 3 at 2.223. This small kurtosis might be related to the fact that leverage is
bounded between 0 and 1.
[Insert Table I about here]
The previous summary statistics of the sample can be graphically observed in Figure 2,
6After this lter, the sample has 109,049 rm-year observations.
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which shows the marginal distributions of investment and leverage decisions. As with Table
I, I exclude observations with investment greater than 200%.
[Insert Figure 2 about here]
III. Identication








2; ), the vector
of structural parameters of the model that will be estimated. These parameters are the
capital depreciation rate (), the constant coe¢ cient of the AR(1) process of the protability
shock (c), the persistence parameter of the protability shock (z), the scale parameter of
the protability shock ("), the concavity of the prot function parameter (), the costs of
issuing debt (d1; 
d




2), and the cost of bankruptcy parameter (). To achieve
identication of these ten model parameters, I assume the remaining two parameters have the
following values:  = 0:98,  c = 35%. The value of  implies a risk-free rate of interest, rf , of
2.04% per year. I x the value of the tax rate,  c, because it was relatively constant during
the period 1988-2009.
Firm decisions are simultaneous and interrelated, and all model parameters will have some
impact on them. However, I can use certain data moments to identify model parameters. The
mean of investment is informative about the capital depreciation rate, . A larger depreciation
rate should imply more investment on average. Variability of rm investment is informative
about the concavity of the prot function parameter, . The lower the parameter, the lower
the marginal protability of the rm, which means that rm investment should respond less
aggressively to protability shocks.
The relative size of debt and equity issuances helps me identify the cost of issuing debt,
d1 and 
d




2. Larger costs of issuing debt compared
to equity should induce relatively larger issuances of equity, and vice versa. The variability
of debt and equity issuances also helps me to pin down parameters d2 and 
e
2. The lower
the quadratic parameters, the less convex the cost of external capital function of the rm,
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which means that debt and equity issuances should be larger for a given protability shock.
The average level of rm leverage is informative of the direct costs of bankruptcy, . Higher
average levels of leverage imply lower direct costs of bankruptcy. Finally, because leverage is a
relatively linear function of the prot shock, I can use the variation of leverage decisions (e.g.,
its persistence and variability) plus the parametric assumptions about the protability shock
(i.e., state variable z follows an AR(1) process) to identify the remaining three parameters of
the process, c, z, and ".
IV. Estimation
This section presents the estimates of the structural parameters of the dynamic model.
The estimation technique I use is the E¢ cient Method of Moments (EMM) developed by
Gallant and Tauchen (1996). The underlying idea of the methodology is to match the moments
generated by the simulation of the model to those implied by the observed data. An important
benet of EMM is that I do not have any discretion in the selection of the moments for the
estimation of the structural model, that is, it is a systematic approach for choosing moments
when using Generalized Method of Moments (GMM).
EMM estimation consists of two steps. In the rst step, I characterize the statistical
properties of the data and select the density function that best ts the sample. In the second
step, I recover the structural parameters of the dynamic model.
A. Description of the Statistical Properties of the Data
I use the semi-nonparametric (SNP) density function, as proposed by Gallant and Tauchen
(1989), to describe the statistical features of the data (i.e., investment and leverage decisions).
The SNP density is a general-purpose model with which I generate a family of density functions
for the joint distribution of the data. I then select the density function that best characterizes
the data in the most parsimonious way.
Appendix 2 describes the construction of the SNP density for the present study. I nd
that the SNP density function that best ts the sample of investment and leverage decisions
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is a bivariate normal density function with a VAR(1) structure for the mean and an ARCH(3)
structure for the variance.
B. Estimation of Structural Parameters
The objective of this second step is to estimate the vector of parameters of the dynamic








2; ). From the previous step, I have the SNP density
that best characterizes the data. The score function of this density is used to construct the
vector of moments that will be used in the GMM objective function. For a candidate set of
parameter values, I simulate the model and compute the objective function. Then, by using
a non-linear optimizer, I search for the parameter values that minimize the GMM criterion.
I use the simulated annealing minimization algorithm, which is robust to local minima.











where fbytgNt=1 are the simulated data, N is the length of the simulation, and en is the quasi-
maximum likelihood estimate of the parameter vector, , of the SNP density function selected
in the rst step.
The EMM estimator is
bn = argmin m;en0 eIn 1m;en (20)
with eIn = 1nPnt=1 h @@ log f ytjxt 1;eni h @@ log f ytjxt 1;eni0,where the weighting matrixeIn assumes the SNP density function closely approximates the true stochastic process of yt.
Under standard regularity conditions, the EMM estimator is consistent and asymptotically
normal.8 If the SNP density closely approximates the true data generating process, then the
e¢ ciency of the EMM estimator will be close to that of maximum likelihood.
For each possible set of parameter values, the simulation length is 100,000 periods after
discarding the rst 200 periods to avoid the inuence of starting values. As before, I assume
7The denition of function f(ytjxt 1; ) is in Appendix 2.
8Gallant and Tauchen (1996) and Gallant and Long (1997) provide the proofs of the asymptotic properties
of the EMM estimator.
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 = 0:98 and  c = 35%. Therefore, the vector of model parameters to estimate is  =








2; ). Table II exhibits EMM point estimates of model parameters,
standard errors and t-statistics. All estimated parameters are statistically signicant, as
suggested by the large t-statistics.
The estimate of the depreciation parameter, , at 0.073 per year is a reasonable value
considering that the mean investment ratio, shown in Table I, is 0.116 per year. The estimate
of the persistence parameter of the protability shock process, z, is 0.672. This value implies
that the protability shock is positively serially correlated and that the current shock has an
important inuence on the shock in next period. In addition, the estimate is similar to that
reported by Hennessy and Whited (2007). The estimated value for the conditional standard
deviation of the protability shock, ", is 0.391, which is slightly above the value estimated
by DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Whited (2011). I nd parameter c to be 0.527, which implies
that the unconditional mean of protability shock is positive (given that z is also positive).
The estimate of the parameter related to the concavity of the prot function, , is 0.624
consistent with the value found by Cooper and Haltiwanger (2006), Hennessy and Whited
(2007), and DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Whited (2011). Debt cost parameters d1 and 
d
2 are
estimated at 0.009 and 0.0004, respectively, while equity cost parameters e1 and 
e
2 are esti-
mated at 0.095 and 0.005, respectively. These values are close to those reported by Altinkilic
and Hansen (2000), Hennessy and Whited (2007), and DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Whited
(2011). Finally, the estimated value of the direct costs of bankruptcy parameter, , is 0.141,
which is slightly above that reported by Hennessy and Whited (2007).
[Insert Table II about here]
V. Model predictions about capital structure choice
The identication of the determinants of capital structure is a strongly contested area
in corporate nance. Part of the literature (e.g., Titman and Wessels (1988), Rajan and
Zingales (1995), Frank and Goyal (2009), etc.) suggests that variation in capital structure is
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explained by time-varying rm characteristics, such as protability and growth opportunities.
On the other hand, Lemmon, Roberts, and Zender (2008) suggest that the role of those
factors in the determination of leverage is fairly limited and, therefore, important factors
are missing in existing regressions. I use the dynamic model to investigate these issues in
the following subsections. In agreement with the latter, I nd that most of the variation
in leverage is explained by the fundamental characteristics of the rm and the power of
traditional determinants to explain such variation is rather small.
A. Features of the model
In this subsection I explain the optimal policies created by the dynamic model, describe the
long-run target leverage of the rm, and investigate the mean-reverting property of leverage
decisions. Regarding the assets side, every period the rm receives a prot shock that changes
the marginal protability of capital in place. If the shock is highly positive, the rm nds
it attractive to invest and issues debt and equity to increase its capital. Because the rm is
forward-looking and expects the prot shock to be lower in the future, the capital increment
is more moderate as compared to the adjustment of a myopic rm. The existence of quadratic
costs of issuance of debt and equity is a further reason to smooth the adjustment. On the
contrary, if the shock is low (e.g., close to zero or even negative), the marginal protability of
current capital decreases and the rm repurchases debt and equity to reduce its assets. The
forward-looking rm knows the prot shock will mean-revert in the future and moderates its
capital reduction as compared to a myopic counterpart. As equation (3) suggests, reducing
debt and equity is assumed costless.
With respect to the nancing side, the capital increments that follow the high prot shocks
are nanced with both debt and equity. Estimated parameters show that issuing equity is
much more costly than issuing debt, so the rm issues relatively more debt than equity to
nance the capital growth and its leverage ratio increases. At the same time, the rm also
trades-o¤ the benets (i.e., the interest tax shield) against the costs of debt (i.e., bankruptcy
costs) to determine the extent of the leverage increment. In periods of high prot shocks the
probability of default goes down and the rm can take more advantage of the interest tax
shield created by debt. In contrast, when the rm receives a low prot shock, it reduces its
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capital mainly by reducing debt, which, in turn, reduces the leverage ratio. One reason why
the rm uses more debt to reduce capital is its forward-looking property. The rm expects
the prot shock to mean-revert in the future and, because reducing capital is assumed costless
while issuing debt is cheaper than issuing equity, the rm prefers to increase its debt capacity
to take more advantage of the expected (better) prot shocks in the future. The other reason
to decrease the leverage ratio is the increased probability of default that follows low prot
shocks. This behavior shows that current leverage (i.e., d and k) is an important state variable
in the rms capital issuance decisions. It also shows that debt policy is the main mechanism
to rebalance rm leverage, while equity policy is relegated to a secondary role.
Figure 3 shows the unconditional distributions of investment and leverage decisions for
a single rm simulated at the values of the parameters estimated in Section IV, that is, the
base case parameters. The model is simulated over 100,000 periods after removing the rst
200 observations to eliminate the inuence of an arbitrary initial point.
[Insert Figure 3 about here]
Payout decisions are made simultaneously with investment and leverage decisions. The
rm pays out money to investors after increasing its size because of high prot shocks. It also
returns money to investors after receiving low prot shocks that induce capital reductions.
On the contrary, the rm issues capital when it receives high prot shocks and is trying to
increase its size.
As described above, the rm decides optimal leverage every period depending on the
current state of the world. That is, optimal leverage is state-contingent. The result of this
behavior is shown in Figure 4, which displays leverage decisions made by a single rm over
time as it receives random prot shocks. The rm is simulated at the base case parameters.
Although optimal leverage changes over time, this type of dynamic models has a constant
target leverage in the long-run sense, concept that is described in DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and
Whited (2011). The target capital structure is the leverage ratio to which the rm would
converge if it were to receive the same neutral prot shock for a long time (i.e., many periods
in a row). Furthermore, they show that, when the rm does not have capital stock adjustment
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costs, target leverage is unique.9 Figure 4 also shows target leverage of the rm for the current
model. After period 700, I make the rm receive a neutral prot shock (z = c) for a long time
and optimal leverage converges to the long-run constant target.
[Insert Figure 4 about here]
Finally, I study whether leverage is mean-reverting, that is, whether leverage oscillates
around a long-run mean level. As before, I simulate a single rm at the values of the para-











where dt+1=kt+1 is book leverage, bML is the long-run mean book leverage, and a1 can be
interpreted as the fraction of the gap between current book leverage and the long-run mean
level that the rm closes every period. After rearranging terms, I estimate the following model
dt+1
kt+1
= a1bML + (1  a1) dt
kt
+ "t+1: (22)
The estimates suggest that rm leverage is, indeed, mean-reverting to the long-run con-
stant value. The coe¢ cient a1 is 0.3350. This estimate implies a moderate speed of adjustment
of 33.50% per year and a half-life of about 1.70 years, that is, it takes the rm approximately
1.70 years to close half the gap between its current book leverage and the long-run mean
level. This estimated speed of mean-reversion is close to that found by Flannery and Rangan
(2006), who suggest a speed of adjustment of 34.40% per year. DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and
Whited (2011) also report a similar speed of adjustment of 37.80% per year.
To summarize, in the context of the dynamic model the rm maximizes its value every
period after receiving a prot shock by changing its size and rebalancing its capital structure.
This implies that active management of leverage ratios coupled with a mean-reverting prot
shock induces the observed mean-reversion of leverage.
9These are the costs the rm faces to adjust (i.e., buy or sell) its stock of physical capital, not the costs of
issuing debt or equity.
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B. Structural di¤erences versus traditional determinants
Lemmon, Roberts, and Zender (2008) suggest that traditional determinants of leverage,
such as protability and market-to-book ratio, have limited power to explain the observed
variation in leverage. I use the dynamic model to create a panel of rms and study these
features of leverage behavior. The panel is composed of 100 rms and rm decisions are
simulated using the parameter values estimated in Section IV. This sample is divided into 10
types or groups of 10 identical rms, and each type is di¤erent in parameter ", that is, they
di¤er with respect to the volatility of prot shocks that rms in each group face (parameter "
ranges from 0.1 to 0.7). This source of heterogeneity introduces variation in all rm decisions
and, in particular, in the unconditional mean of leverage decisions for each type of rm. That
is, because each type of rm in the panel is simulated under di¤erent primitive assumptions
(i.e., di¤erent volatility of prot shocks), leverage decisions of each rm type uctuates around
a di¤erent mean value. Each of the 100 rms is simulated over 1,000 periods after discarding
the rst 200 observations to eliminate the inuence of an arbitrary initial point.
First, I investigate the role of rms initial leverage in the determination of future leverage.
Accordingly, I estimate the following regression
di;t+1
ki;t+1













where di;t+1=ki;t+1 is book leverage, di;0=ki;0 is initial book leverage, (ki;t; zi;t)=ki;t is prof-
itability (operating prots), vi;t=ki;t is the market-to-book ratio (investment opportunities),
i;t is the volatility of operating income, and divi;t=ki;t is lagged dividends.
10 Index i refers
to rm i, while index t refers to time period t.
Table III shows the results from estimating di¤erent specications of equation (23). Col-
umn (1) shows the coe¢ cients corresponding to the regression of leverage on its usual de-
terminants (e.g., protability, market-to-book ratio, operating income volatility, and lagged
dividends) excluding initial leverage. The adjusted R-square of this specication is a modest
10%. Initial leverage alone, as shown in column (2), accounts for 35% of the variation in book
leverage, which suggests that an important part of the variation in capital structure is due to
10Volatility of operating income is dened as the standard deviation of the previous three years of operating
income, (ki;t; zi;t)=ki;t.
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stable factors. Column (3) presents the results from estimating equation (23) (i.e., including
initial leverage), which shows that the adjusted R-square improves a bit to 44%, compared to
the 35% of column (2).
Initial leverage acts as a proxy for the mean of the unconditional distribution of leverage
decisions. In column (4) I add mean book leverage, (T 1t=0 di;t=ki;t)=T , as a regressor to the
specication in column (2). Consistently, results show that the coe¢ cient of initial leverage
decreases close to zero, while the coe¢ cient of mean leverage is around 1 and highly statis-
tically signicant. In addition, the adjusted R-square for this specication increases to 58%.
Finally, column (5) incorporates mean leverage to equation (23) and further conrms previ-
ous results. The adjusted R-square for the specication in column (5) goes up to 67%. The
dissimilar R-square of the di¤erent specications highlights the importance of rm specic
xed e¤ects in the explanation of leverage as opposed to traditional determinants.
[Insert Table III about here]
Second, I perform a variance decomposition of book leverage to ascertain the explana-
tory power of the traditional determinants (i.e., protability, market-to-book ratio, operating
income volatility, and lagged dividends) and of the constant rm-specic factor (i.e., initial
leverage and mean leverage). I use the Type III sum of squares for each e¤ect in the model
and normalize the estimates to add up to one.
Table IV shows the fractions of the model sum of squares that is attributable to each vari-
able. As before, column (1) shows the variance decomposition for the regression of leverage
on its usual determinants excluding initial leverage. In this specication, each of the four
variables account for a considerable part of the explained sum of squares. In column (2),
the entire explained sum of squares is attributable to initial leverage because it is the only
determinant of the regression. Column (3) presents the results for the specication in equa-
tion (23). Initial leverage accounts for 84.69% of the explained variation of book leverage,
while protability, market-to-book ratio, volatility of operating income, and lagged dividends
account for only 5.10%, 7.43%, 0.33%, and 2.45%, respectively.
Column (4) shows the variance decomposition for the regression of leverage on initial
leverage and mean leverage. Not surprisingly, initial leverage loses almost all its explanatory
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power, which goes to mean leverage. This result is conrmed in column (5), which includes
mean leverage as a covariate in equation (23). In this specication, initial leverage accounts
for 0% of the explained variation of leverage, while mean leverage accounts for 90.09% of
the explained sum of squares. Furthermore, the explanatory power of protability, market-
to-book ratio, operating income volatility, and lagged dividends diminishes to 4.55%, 5.11%,
0.06%, and 0.19%, respectively. These results further conrm the importance of rm-specic
xed e¤ects as leverage determinants and the relatively small role played by traditional de-
terminants.
[Insert Table IV about here]
Finally, I study the impact of introducing time-varying determinants to the autoregressive
model described in equation (22) on the speed of mean-reversion of book leverage. That is,
I replace the mean of leverage decisions, bML, in the aforementioned equation by the usual
leverage determinants. The underlying idea of this exercise is that if traditional determinants
of book leverage play an important role in the determination of the value to which book
leverage mean-reverts, then their exclusion should considerably decrease the speed of mean-
reversion of leverage. The cause of this is that rm leverage would be mean-reverting to a
value that di¤ers from the one specied by the econometrician.




























(1  a1) di;tki;t + "i;t+1
(24)
where the variables are those dened in equation (23). Results are presented in Table V. Col-
umn (4) exhibits the estimation results for a specication that considers only initial leverage
and mean leverage (i.e., the most important determinant according to results in tables III
and IV). The speed of mean-reversion is 35.87% per year, which implies a half-life of about
1.56 years, that is, it takes the rm approximately 1.56 years to close half the gap between
its current book leverage and the long-run mean level. This result is close to that found for
the case of a single rm in equation (22).
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Columns (2) and (3) show that excluding mean leverage substantially reduces the speed
of mean reversion to 19.79% and 19.16% per year, respectively. Moreover, column (1) shows
that if initial leverage (i.e., the proxy for mean leverage) is also excluded, then the speed of
mean reversion falls even further to 12.77% per year. This result is consistent with those of
Fama and French (2002), who use specications similar to the one in column (1) and nd
speeds of mean reversion of book leverage between 10% and 18% per year.
Finally, column (5) presents the results of adding the traditional determinants of book
leverage to the specication in column (4). The consequence of this is a small increase in the
speed of mean-reversion of book leverage from 35.87% to 37.11% per year.
[Insert Table V about here]
This subsection shows that model results are consistent with Lemmon, Roberts, and Zen-
der (2008). That is, traditional determinants of capital structure, mainly protability and
market-to-book ratio, have limited power to explain leverage decisions and most of the vari-
ation in leverage is explained by the constant value around which leverage oscillates. In the
context of the dynamic model, this mean value is determined by the structural characteris-
tics of the rm, such as the production technology of the rm (e.g., the elasticity of output
with respect to capital in the production function, the rate of depreciation of capital), the
behavior of the management team (e.g., how forward-looking the rm is, the attitude of the
rm towards risk), etc. The variation of any of these primitive characteristics changes the
level to which leverage mean-reverts. Furthermore, this constant value does not depend on
the current state of the world (i.e., previous-period and current d, k, and z) or on functions
of that state (e.g., time-varying determinants such as operating prots, market-to-book ratio,
or operating income volatility).
C. Convergence and stability of leverage
By constructing four portfolios of rms sorted according to their current leverage, Lemmon,
Roberts, and Zender (2008) present two interesting features of the data: convergence and
stability of leverage. The former refers to the fact that rms with relatively high (low) leverage
are likely to return to more moderate levels of leverage over time, while the latter implies that
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rms with relatively high (low) leverage tend to keep relatively high (low) leverage for long
periods of time (more than 20 years). I study whether these characteristics of the data appear
in the context of the dynamic model. I follow the procedure used by the aforementioned
authors to construct the four portfolios (i.e., very high, high, medium, and low
leverage portfolios). The sample for this analysis is the simulated panel of rms described in
the previous subsection.
Figure 5 shows the actual book leverage paths created by the simulated panel of rms. It
is evident that the dynamic model generates leverage decisions characterized by both conver-
gence and stability of leverage. In the context of the dynamic model, convergence of leverage
is due to the mean-reverting property of leverage decisions described in Subsection V.A. That
is, when leverage decisions of the di¤erent rms are averaged in the portfolios, their uctu-
ation around the mean creates the observed convergence. With a speed of mean-reversion
around 35% per year, most of the convergence occurs in the rst 5-7 years after portfolio
formation. Regarding the stability of leverage, each type of rm in the panel has a di¤erent
mean value around which leverage oscillates. That is, the di¤erent structural assumptions
for each type of rm (i.e., prot volatility, ", ranging from 0.1 to 0.7) create a type-specic
constant value toward which leverage mean-reverts. Thus, the values to which the four lines
in Figure 5 converge are the average of the unconditional means of leverage decisions of all
rms included in the corresponding portfolio.
[Insert Figure 5 about here]
Next, I construct the unexpected leverage portfolios. First, I regress book leverage
on protability, market-to-book ratio, volatility of operating income, and lagged dividends.
Second, I use the regression residuals (i.e., the unexpected leverage) to sort rms into the four
portfolios. Finally, I follow the average book leverage of each portfolio during the next 20
years. The objective of this procedure is to remove the observable heterogeneity associated
with traditional determinants of leverage. That is, the expectation is to nd that there is
less cross-sectional variation in leverage in the period of portfolio formation and that the four
averages converge to a single line over time. Figure 6 presents the unexpected book leverage
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paths generated by the panel of rms and shows that the results are almost identical to those
of Figure 5. Thus, the regression residual explains most of the variation in leverage across
rms in the panel, and the usual time-varying determinants have little power to explain such
variation.
[Insert Figure 6 about here]
Finally, I repeat the previous experiment and reconstruct the unexpected leverageport-
folios including the volatility of prot shocks, ", as a regressor. That is, I include the values
of parameter " that were used to introduce rm heterogeneity into the panel. As mentioned
above, because each type of rm in the panel is simulated under a di¤erent structural as-
sumption (i.e., a di¤erent value of parameter "), each rm type has a unique unconditional
mean of leverage decisions around which leverage oscillates. Given this direct link between
the volatility of prot shocks and the mean of the unconditional distribution of leverage de-
cisions, I expect regressor " to explain most of the remaining variation in leverage. Figure
7 presents the results of this test. As expected, the gure shows that parameter " correctly
captures most rm heterogeneity. That is, there is less cross-sectional variation in leverage in
the initial period and then the four lines converge almost completely over time.
[Insert Figure 7 about here]
This subsection conrms the results of the previous one. The dynamic model generates rm
decisions that are consistent with the features of the data described by Lemmon, Roberts, and
Zender (2008). In other words, the constant value around which leverage oscillates explains
most of the variation in leverage and traditional determinants of capital structure, mainly
protability and market-to-book ratio, have limited power to explain leverage decisions. As
previously explained, the time-invariant value is a function of the fundamental characteristics
of the rm and independent of the state of the world.
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VI. Conclusion
I estimate a dynamic structural model of the rm based on the trade-o¤ theory of capital
structure that features endogenous investment, leverage, and payout decisions. The model
explicitly includes the benets (i.e., interest tax shields) and the costs (i.e., costs of nancial
distress) of debt, as well as the costs of external capital. I use the E¢ cient Method of Moments
to estimate the structural parameters that best t the characteristics of the data.
The dynamic model generates leverage decisions that mean-revert to a long-run constant
value at a moderate speed of around 35% per year. In the context of the dynamic model,
this value does not depend on the state of the world (e.g., time-dependent factors such as
operating prots or market-to-book ratio), but on the primitive features of the rm (e.g.,
managerial behavior, production technology used by the rm, etc.)
In agreement with Lemmon, Roberts, and Zender (2008), the dynamic model suggests
that the power of traditional leverage determinants, mainly protability and market-to-book
ratio, to explain leverage decisions is fairly limited and most of the cross-sectional leverage
variation is explained by unobserved rm-specic xed e¤ects. Moreover, I construct both
the actual and unexpected leverage portfolios and nd that important observed features
of the data, such as convergence and stability of leverage, also appear in the context of the
dynamic model. An implication of these ndings is that traditional capital structure studies
might be missing relevant leverage determinants. As a step in this direction, I study the
e¤ects of constructing the unexpected portfolios including the model parameter used to
introduce heterogeneity in the panel of rms. As expected, the outcome of this experiment is
that leverage stability disappears almost entirely.
Overall, the dynamic model provides a theory-based explanation for the unobserved rm-
specic components that govern the cross-sectional variation in leverage. That is, it helps to
have a more complete understanding of the role played by the primitive characteristics of the
rm versus the traditional time-varying factors. These results highlight the importance of
structural modeling as a complement of the reduced-form approach in corporate nance. The
former may help the latter to nd relevant variables to include in regression models. More
research in this area would be useful.
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Appendix 1. Implementation of the model
The model in this paper cannot be solved in closed-form. However, its solution can be
numerically approximated. The numerical solution of the dynamic model is obtained via value
function iteration, as described by Judd (1998).
In order to implement the model, I need to discretize the state space of k, d, and z. I let
the capital stock, k, belong to the set
ek = hk; k (1  )1=2 ; k (1  ) ; :::; k (1  )20i (25)
where k satises equation (8). The stock of debt, d, lies in the set








with k also satisfying equation (8). This choice of the discretization of the state space of k
and d reects the fact that the investment decision is a considerably non-linear function of the
prot shock while the leverage decision, on the contrary, is a relatively more linear mapping
of z. These features of the dynamic model can be observed in Figure 3.
The AR(1) process for the protability shock, z, dened in equation (1) is transformed
into a discrete-state Markov chain following the quadrature method of Tauchen (1986). I let
z have 21 points of support in the set












Appendix 2. Construction of the Semi-Nonparametric (SNP) Density Function
Let fytg denote the true stochastic process of investment rate and leverage. The data are
assumed to be a realization of a stationary time series. Let the conditional distribution of
yt, p(yt j yt 1; yt 2; :::), depend only on L lags of the data, and let xt 1 be the vector that
collects the lags yt j . Therefore, yt is a vector of length 2, xt 1 = (yt L0 ; yt L+10 ; :::; yt 10)0
is a vector of length 2L, and the conditional distribution of yt can be written as p(yt j xt 1).
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The objective is to closely approximate the true conditional distribution, p(yt j xt 1), using
an SNP density function f(yt j xt 1; ). This function has the following form













where xt 1 is the location function, Rxt 1 is the scale function, and h(ztjxt 1) is the condi-
tional density of innovation zt.
The location function is linear and has the form
xt 1 = b0 +B1yt L +B2yt L+1 + :::+BLyt 1
= b0 +Bxt 1
(29)
where b0 is a 2x1 vector and B is a 2x2L matrix.
The scale function is an upper triangular matrix that depends on xt 1 and can be con-

























a 3x1 vector). Vector p0 is 3x1, matrices P1 through PLr are 3x2, and vectors G1 through
GLg are 3x1. This is a GARCH(Lg; Lr) specication of the scale function. Setting the




The conditional density h(ztjxt 1) has the form of a Hermite polynomial
h(zt j xt 1) = [P (zt; xt 1)]
2  (zt)R
[P (u; xt 1)]2  (u) du
(31)
where P (zt; xt 1) is a polynomial in (zt; xt 1) of degree K and (zt) is a standard normal
density function. In the present study, (zt) is bivariate.
Polynomial P (zt; xt 1) can be written in rectangular form as










where  and  are multi-indexes of maximal degrees Kz and Kx, respectively, and K =
Kz +Kx.
Therefore, the parameter vector of the SNP density is
 =












It is convenient now to discriminate among the di¤erent lag lengths that appear in the SNP
density: L is the number of lags in xt 1 , L+Lr is the number of lags in Rxt 1 , and Lp is the
number of lags in the xt 1 component of P (zt; xt 1). In addition, L = max(L; L+Lr; Lp).
When multivariate stochastic processes require a high degree Hermite polynomial to t
them, several possibly unnecessary interactions or cross product terms appear. Therefore, two
additional tuning parameters, Iz and Ix, lter out these high order interactions. For example,
a positive Iz implies that all interactions of order larger than kz   Iz are eliminated. The
same reasoning applies to Ix.
Finally, the set of tuning parameters of the SNP density is
(L; Lg; Lr; Lp; kz; Iz; kx; Ix) : (34)
The objective of this rst step of the EMM procedure is to generate a family of density
functions for the joint distribution of the data, namely, investment and leverage decisions,
and to select that density function that achieves the optimal description of the data. This
family is created by changing the tuning parameters of the SNP density. Di¤erent values of
the tuning parameters imply di¤erent characterizations of the process for yt.11
For a particular choice of the tuning parameters, I need to estimate , the parameter
vector of the SNP density, by minimizing the sample objective function
en = argmin sn ()
sn () =   1n
Pn
t=1 log f (ytjxt 1; )
(35)
where n is the length of the observed time series.
After selecting di¤erent values for the tuning parameters and doing the corresponding
minimization step, I have the family of density functions from which I can choose the one
11Gallant and Tauchen (2001) provide a complete description of the restrictions implied by di¤erent settings
of the tuning parameters.
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that best ts the data in the most parsimonious way. To search for the optimal model, Gallant
and Tauchen (1998) suggest using the Schwarz Bayes Information Criterion (BIC) (Schwarz






log (n) : (36)
Their suggestion is to move upward along an expansion path searching for low values of
the criterion until a satisfactory model is found. The rst term of the criterion rewards models
that achieve good ts (i.e., low sn
en) and the second term penalizes models that are not
parsimonious (i.e., large dim ()).
Table VI shows the family of density functions and the model selection strategy. I start
expanding the number of lags of the location function, L, and nd out that L = 1 achieves
the lowest BIC value. Next, I expand the number of lags of the ARCH part of the scale
function, Lr, and discover that Lr = 3 generates the lowest BIC value. Then I expand Kz,
but the BIC values and the t-statistics of the Hermite polynomial suggest this expansion is not
warranted. Finally, I expand the number of lags of the GARCH part of the scale function, Lg,
but the BIC values and the t-statistics suggest this expansion is not acceptable. Therefore,
the BIC-preferred model is12
(L; Lg; Lr; Lp; kz; Iz; kx; Ix) = (1; 0; 3; 1; 0; 0; 0; 0) : (37)
This result implies that the SNP density function that best characterizes the stochastic process
of investment and leverage decisions is a bivariate normal density function with a VAR(1)
structure for the location function (i.e., the mean) and an ARCH(3) structure for the scale
function (i.e., the variance).
[Insert Table VI about here]
Table VII displays the estimates, standard errors, and t-statistics of the vector of parame-
ters of the selected SNP density function. All coe¢ cients are highly statistically signicant.
[Insert Table VII about here]
12Lp  1 is a convention in the literature. It was adopted for programming convenience and it is irrelevant
when Kx = 0.
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Figure 1. Dynamic behavior of the rm over time. During period t, the rm operates
with capital k and has debt d. At the end of period t (i.e., at moment t) the rm receives a realiza-
tion of the protability shock, z. This completes the state vector of the rm at moment t, namely,
(k; d; z; k ; d ; z ). If the shock is bad enough to make rm value lower than the nominal value of
the debt, then the rm goes into bankruptcy (B) and is liquidated (L), that is, the dynamic process
ends. On the contrary, if the rm avoids bankruptcy (No B), it continues in the business and selects
xd and xe. These choices determine the capital k0 and debt d0 to be used during period t+ 1.
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Figure 2. Empirical distributions of investment ratio and book leverage decisions.
The sample consists of all rms in the Compustat database from 1988 to 2009, except regulated,
nancial or public service rms. The histograms show the empirical distribution of investment ratio
and book leverage decisions of the rms in the sample.
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Figure 3. Asymptotic distributions of investment ratio and book leverage de-
cisions. The model is simulated over 100,000 periods after removing the rst 200 observations to
eliminate the inuence of an arbitrary start. The simulation is parameterized at the values estimated in
Section IV. The histograms exhibit the asymptotic distributions of investment ratio and book leverage
decisions generated by the dynamic model for a single rm.
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Figure 4. Simulation of book leverage decisions. The model is simulated over 1000
periods after removing the rst 200 observations to eliminate the inuence of an arbitrary start. The
simulation is parameterized at the values estimated in Section IV. The gure exhibits the optimal book
leverage policy generated by the dynamic model for a single rm. In each period, the rm receives
a protability shock and decides next-period optimal leverage. Starting at period 701, I make the
rm receive a constant prot shock at z = c. The model generates a constant target leverage in the
long-run sense to which leverage decisions converges over time.
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Figure 5. Actual book leverage portfolios. The gure displays the actual book leverage
paths generated by the dynamic model. The four portfolios (i.e., very high, high, medium, and
low leverage portfolios) are constructed by sorting rms according to their current leverage. Each
line represents the average actual book leverage of each portfolio. The sample in this analysis includes
100 rms, which are simulated at the estimated values of the parameters. This sample is divided into
10 di¤erent types, each of which includes 10 identical rms. The types di¤er in parameter ", which
ranges from 0.1 to 0.7 and represents the volatility of prot shocks. Each rm is simulated over 1,000
periods after removing the rst 200 observations to eliminate the inuence of an arbitrary start.
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Figure 6. Unexpected book leverage portfolios. The gure displays the unexpected
book leverage paths generated by the dynamic model. The four portfolios (i.e., very high, high,
medium, and lowleverage portfolios) are constructed by sorting rms according to their current
leverage. Each line represents the average unexpected book leverage of each portfolio. The sample in
this analysis includes 100 rms, which are simulated at the estimated values of the parameters. This
sample is divided into 10 di¤erent types, each of which includes 10 identical rms. The types di¤er in
parameter ", which ranges from 0.1 to 0.7 and represents the volatility of prot shocks. Each rm is
simulated over 1,000 periods after removing the rst 200 observations to eliminate the inuence of an
arbitrary start.
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Figure 7. Unexpected book leverage portfolios. The gure displays the unexpected
book leverage paths generated by the dynamic model, including parameter " as a regressor. The
four portfolios (i.e., very high, high, medium, and low leverage portfolios) are constructed
by sorting rms according to their current leverage. Each line represents the average unexpected
book leverage of each portfolio. The sample in this analysis includes 100 rms, which are simulated
at the estimated values of the parameters. This sample is divided into 10 di¤erent types, each of
which includes 10 identical rms. The types di¤er in parameter ", which ranges from 0.1 to 0.7 and
represents the volatility of prot shocks. Each rm is simulated over 1,000 periods after removing the
rst 200 observations to eliminate the inuence of an arbitrary start.
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Table I
Summary Statistics of the Sample
The sample consists of all rms in the Compustat database from 1988 to 2009, except regulated,
nancial or public service rms. The table presents the mean, median, standard deviation, minimum
and maximum values, skewness, and kurtosis of investment and leverage in the nal sample. Investment
ratio is [k0   k (1  )] = [k (1  )], while book leverage is d0=k0.
Variable Mean Median Standard
Deviation
Min Max Skewness Kurtosis
Investment Ratio 0.1158 0.0563 0.3687 -0.9977 1.9998 1.6105 8.0830




EMM Estimates of Model Parameters
The sample consists of all rms in the Compustat database from 1988 to 2009, except regulated,
nancial or public service rms. The table presents E¢ cient Method of Moments (EMM) estimates,
standard errors, and t-statistics of model parameters. These parameters are: the capital depreciation
rate (), the constant coe¢ cient of the protability shock process (c), the persistence parameter of the
protability process (z), the conditional standard deviation of the protability shock process ("),
the concavity of the operating prot function (), the costs of issuing debt (d1, 
d
2) and equity (
e
1,
e2), and the direct costs of bankruptcy ().
Parameter Estimate Standard Error t-Statistic
δ 0.0733 0.0009 85.02
c 0.5272 0.0097 54.60
ρ z 0.6719 0.0286 23.53
σ ε 0.3908 0.0134 29.12
α 0.6244 0.0232 26.88
λ 1
d 0.0091 0.0004 25.06
λ 2
d 0.0004 0.0001 3.04
λ 1
e 0.0951 0.0043 21.88
λ 2
e 0.0049 0.0017 2.90
ξ 0.1412 0.0282 5.01
42
Table III
Regressions to Explain the Level of Book Leverage
The simulated panel is composed of 100 rms and is divided into 10 types of 10 identical rms. Each
type is di¤erent in parameter ", which ranges from 0.1 to 0.7. This parameter captures the volatility
of prot shocks that rms in each group face. Each rm is simulated over 1,000 periods after discarding
the rst 200 observations to eliminate the inuence of an arbitrary initial point. The simulation is
parameterized at the values estimated in Section IV. The table shows the regression coe¢ cients of book
leverage, di;t+1=ki;t+1, on initial leverage, di;0=ki;0, mean leverage, (
T 1
t=0 di;t=ki;t)=T , protability
(operating prots), (ki;t; zi;t)=ki;t, investment opportunities (market-to-book ratio), vi;t=ki;t, volatil-
ity of operating income, i;t , and lagged dividends, divi;t=ki;t. The numbers in parentheses are the
t-statistics for the regression coe¢ cients.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Intercept 0.5806 0.1932 0.2870 -0.0001 0.0720
(2212.63) (603.13) (818.06) (-0.21) (253.44)
Initial Leverage 0.5956 0.5583 0.0222 -0.0017
(900.97) (1018.41) (27.39) (-3.03)
Mean Leverage 0.9980 0.9841
(924.32) (1336.98)
Profitability 0.2437 0.3134 0.3555
(214.38) (360.35) (611.09)
Market-to-Book Ratio -0.0344 -0.0295 -0.0283
(-559.93) (-625.77) (-898.93)
Operating Income Volatility -0.1702 -0.1713 -0.1765
(-482.69) (-506.96) (-577.11)
Lagged Dividends -1.3751 -0.7266 -0.1747
(-310.03) (-211.15) (-74.82)




Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) for Book Leverage Regressions
The simulated panel is composed of 100 rms and is divided into 10 types of 10 identical rms. Each
type is di¤erent in parameter ", which ranges from 0.1 to 0.7. This parameter captures the volatility
of prot shocks that rms in each group face. Each rm is simulated over 1,000 periods after discarding
the rst 200 observations to eliminate the inuence of an arbitrary initial point. The simulation is
parameterized at the values estimated in Section IV. The table exhibits the variance decomposition
for di¤erent model specications for book leverage. The analysis of variance uses the Type III sum of
squares for each e¤ect in the model and the estimates are normalized to add up to one. Book leverage is
di;t+1=ki;t+1, initial leverage is di;0=ki;0, mean leverage is (
T 1
t=0 di;t=ki;t)=T , protability (operating
prots) is (ki;t; zi;t)=ki;t, investment opportunities (market-to-book ratio) is vi;t=ki;t, volatility of
operating income is i;t , and lagged dividends is divi;t=ki;t.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Initial Leverage 1.0000 0.8469 0.0009 0.0000
Mean Leverage 0.9991 0.9009
Profitability 0.3009 0.0510 0.0455
Market-to-Book Ratio 0.4376 0.0743 0.0511
Operating Income Volatility 0.0506 0.0033 0.0006
Lagged Dividends 0.2110 0.0245 0.0019




Regressions to Explain Changes in Book Leverage
The simulated panel is composed of 100 rms and is divided into 10 types of 10 identical rms. Each
type is di¤erent in parameter ", which ranges from 0.1 to 0.7. This parameter captures the volatility
of prot shocks that rms in each group face. Each rm is simulated over 1,000 periods after discarding
the rst 200 observations to eliminate the inuence of an arbitrary initial point. The simulation is
parameterized at the values estimated in Section IV. The table shows the regression coe¢ cients of book
leverage, di;t+1=ki;t+1, on initial leverage, di;0=ki;0, mean leverage, (
T 1
t=0 di;t=ki;t)=T , protability
(operating prots), (ki;t; zi;t)=ki;t, investment opportunities (market-to-book ratio), vi;t=ki;t, volatil-
ity of operating income, i;t , lagged dividends, divi;t=ki;t, and lagged book leverage, di;t=ki;t. The
numbers in parentheses are the t-statistics for the regression coe¢ cients.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Speed of Mean-Reversion 0.1277 0.1979 0.1916 0.3587 0.3711
(193.45) (348.94) (302.35) (462.20) (547.85)
Intercept -0.2137 0.2035 -0.1148 0.0000 -0.0444
(-57.83) (165.93) (-64.21) (-0.03) (-69.10)
Initial Leverage 0.5739 0.6424 -0.0062 -0.0019
(201.88) (234.27) (-2.92) (-1.66)
Mean Leverage 1.0062 1.0240
(291.34) (445.18)
Profitability 4.0907 2.0559 0.8243
(602.47) (625.00) (695.42)
Market-to-Book Ratio 0.1063 0.0346 0.0111
(242.71) (153.71) (113.57)
Operating Income Volatility -1.5580 -0.5405 -0.0604
(-85.33) (-60.72) (-19.09)
Lagged Dividends -0.4141 -0.1962 -0.0101
(-15.06) (-14.75) (-2.12)
Half-Life 5.07 3.14 3.26 1.56 1.49




SNP Density Function Selection
The sample consists of all rms in the Compustat database from 1988 to 2009, except regulated,
nancial or public service rms. The table exhibits the family of density functions for the sample
of investment and leverage decisions. Each density function (i.e., each row) is characterized by a set
of tuning parameters. The tuning parameters are the following: L is the lag length of the location
function, Lg is the lag length of the GARCH part of the scale function, Lr is the lag length of the
ARCH part of the scale function. Lp is the lag length in the xt 1 component of P (zt; xt 1), Kz is the
degree of the Hermite polynomial along the z dimension, Kx is the degree of the Hermite polynomial
along the x dimension, and Iz and Ix lter out the cross product terms of the polynomial expansion.
The remaining columns are: dim() is the dimension of the parameter vector of the SNP density
function, sn is the sample objective function, and BIC is the Schwarz Bayes Information Criterion.
The bold row shows the BIC-preferred model, that is, the density function that best ts the data.
L μ L g L r L p K z I z K x I x dim( θ) s n BIC
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 5 0.07146 0.07173
1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 9 -0.29371 -0.29321
2 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 13 -0.26582 -0.26510
3 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 17 -0.26344 -0.26250
4 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 21 -0.19515 -0.19399
1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 15 -0.30539 -0.30457
1 0 2 1 0 0 0 0 21 -0.30022 -0.29906
1 0 3 1 0 0 0 0 27 -0.37497 -0.37348
1 0 4 1 0 0 0 0 33 -0.36655 -0.36474
1 0 3 1 1 1 0 0 30 2.24495 2.24655
1 0 3 1 2 2 0 0 32 2.29419 2.29589
1 0 3 1 3 3 0 0 34 2.20703 2.20885
1 0 3 1 4 4 0 0 36 2.98970 2.99162
1 0 3 1 5 5 0 0 38 1.58752 1.58956
1 0 3 1 6 6 0 0 40 1.02463 1.02671
1 1 3 1 0 0 0 0 30 -0.35088 -0.34923
1 2 3 1 0 0 0 0 33 -0.36638 -0.36456
1 3 3 1 0 0 0 0 36 -0.37476 -0.37279
1 4 3 1 0 0 0 0 39 -0.37043 -0.36812
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Table VII
SNP Density Function Estimation
The sample consists of all rms in the Compustat database from 1988 to 2009, except regulated,
nancial or public service rms. The table shows the estimates, standard errors, and t-statistics of
the vector of parameters of the selected semi-nonparametric (SNP) density function, that is, the one
that best ts the data in the most parsimonious way. The preferred density function is a bivariate
normal density function with a V AR(1) structure for the mean (i.e., L = 1) and an ARCH(3)
structure for the variance (i.e., Lr = 3). Argument irefers to investments and argument lrefers
to leverage.
Parameter Estimate Standard Error t-Statistic Parameter Estimate Standard Error t-Statistic
Mean Variance
Intercept Intercept
b 0 (i) 0.07530 0.00162 46.51 p 0 (i) 0.14582 0.00071 204.68
b 0 (l) 0.12702 0.00074 172.45 p 0 (i,l) -0.04491 0.00108 -41.70
VAR( 1) p 0 (l) 0.08388 0.00037 223.84
B 1 (i,i) 0.23742 0.00316 75.21 ARCH( 3)
B 1 (i,l) -0.02554 0.00316 -8.09 P 1 (i,i) 0.05613 0.00271 20.69
B 1 (l,i) 0.01183 0.00155 7.65 P 1 (i,l) 0.19348 0.00540 35.81
B 1 (l,l) 0.73574 0.00143 513.84 P 1 (il,i) 0.09656 0.00392 24.65
P 1 (il,l) 0.05097 0.00718 7.10
P 1 (l,i) 0.03597 0.00146 24.65
P 1 (l,l) 0.03618 0.00216 16.72
P 2 (i,i) 0.10954 0.00302 36.32
P 2 (i,l) 0.08999 0.00448 20.08
P 2 (il,i) -0.01937 0.00439 -4.41
P 2 (il,l) 0.10001 0.00732 13.66
P 2 (l,i) 0.04168 0.00156 26.72
P 2 (l,l) 0.20367 0.00331 61.62
P 3 (i,i) 0.16464 0.00321 51.32
P 3 (i,l) 0.30434 0.00590 51.57
P 3 (il,i) 0.09904 0.00439 22.57
P 3 (il,l) 0.07434 0.00819 9.07
P 3 (l,i) 0.07204 0.00162 44.46
P 3 (l,l) 0.21370 0.00288 74.11
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